It is shown that the independence of the continuum hypothesis points to the unique definite status of the set of intermediate cardinality: the intermediate set exists only as a subset of continuum. This latent status is a consequence of duality of the members of the set. Due to the structural inhomogeneity of the intermediate set, its complete description falls into several "sections" (theories) with their special main laws, dimensions, and directions, i.e., the complete description of the one-dimensional intermediate set is multidimensional. Quantum mechanics is one of these theories.
The concept of discrete space is always regarded as a unique alternative to continuous space. Nevertheless, there is one more possibility originated from the continuum problem: the set of intermediate cardinality represents the golden mean between the opposing concepts.
But although the continuum problem has been solved [1] , the status of the set of intermediate cardinality is still unclear. The commonly held view is that, according to the independence of the continuum hypothesis (CH), we can neither prove nor refute existence of the intermediate set and, therefore, CH or its negation must be taken as an additional axiom.
However, it may be stated that there exists a unique definite status of the intermediate set which is consistent with the independence of the continuum hypothesis. Since, by definition, the set of intermediate cardinality I should be a subset of continuum R, the independence of CH may be understood as impossibility, in principle, to separate the subset of intermediate cardinality from continuum. In other words, the independence of CH means that for any real number x ∈ R the sentence x ∈ I is undecidable. Reasons of this inseparability, if any, should be investigated.
This latent status is the only definite status of the set of intermediate cardinality that is consistent with the generally accepted solution of the continuum problem. However, it is necessary to know that standard Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF) gives correct description of the notion of set, i.e., we need settheoretic analog of Church's thesis in order to be sure that we have reliable solution of the continuum problem independent of concrete formalization of the concept of set. This thesis ensures that any changes in the collection of selfevident statements will not alter the present solution of the continuum problem and therefore the Zermelo-Fraenkel collection of axioms is, in this restricted sense, complete. This understanding of completeness implies that the independence of the statement is not a disadvantage of the formalization but a sign of some peculiar property of the set in question.
Note that, if we postulate existence of the intermediate set (in other words, if we take the negation of CH as an axiom), the result will be the same: since any way of obtaining the set is forbidden by the independence of CH, we have to reconcile with the same hidden intermediate subset in continuum which we can get without any additional assumption.
In order to separate some finite set we do not need any fixed rule (algorithm) if we are interested only in the number of members. We may select members at random or by an arbitrary algorithm until the collection has requisite cardinality. In the case of an infinite subset, the separation procedure must be based on some appropriate rule. From the undecidability of CH it follows that we have no rule for separation of the intermediate subset.
According to the separation axiom scheme, for any set and for any property expressed by some formula there exists a subset of the set, which contains only members of the set having the property. Hence, if the members of the intermediate subset have any discriminating property relative to the other members of continuum, then we can separate the subset. From the independence of CH it follows that we cannot express any property of the members of the intermediate set, i.e., any property we can formulate implies separation of either countable or continuous subset of continuum. This does not mean that members of the intermediate set have no properties and therefore this subset is empty.
If we have a set consisting of members of two kinds, it is possible that there are exist members combining properties of both kinds. This trivial possibility makes substantial difficulties when the properties are mutually exclusive. In this case, the properties may not become apparent simultaneously. However, they may manifest itself under different tests: such a dual member "looks" exactly like member of one of these kinds depending on testing procedure. This complicates the problem: we must introduce two alternative kinds of testing procedure and ensure comprehensive test of each member. But set theory does not provide for the two-stage procedure. Since one-stage test is not sufficient for detection of the dual members, we get the independent statement.
As an illustration, consider a brick road which consists of black bricks and white bricks. If we know (or suspect) that among them there are some bricks which have white top sides and black bottom sides (or vice versa, i.e., these bricks combine the sides "from" the white brick and "from" the black brick), we, nevertheless, cannot find them. Based only on the top view, the problem of separation (and even existence) of the black-and-white bricks of this kind is undecidable. Each brick can be black-and-white with equal probability. However, if we have the top view and the bottom view, we can find these bricks: each of them looks like a white brick in the one view and like a black brick in the other view ("black-white duality").
What is the basic difference between the members of the countable set and continuum? Here we touch upon the problem of relationship between cardinality and nature of a set. This problem represents apparent formal difficulties for set theory in its present over-formalized form. Formalization makes "packaged product" into which one cannot introduce new insufficiently formalized (formalizable) concepts. Sets are real objects which may have a priori unpredictable properties related, naturally, to independent statements.
George Cantor believed that cardinality of a set is independent of nature of its members. But this is obvious only for finite sets. It is quite clear that, for any infinite set, "to be a member of the set" means "to have some special property". Of course, we mean typical set-generating members.
From the operational viewpoint, a natural number and a real number are outputs of different procedures: counting and measurement. Any real number is length of some interval or segment, i.e., the key property, making the difference, is plausibly length. Roughly speaking, the countable set basically consist of the zero-length (point-like) members, while the exemplifying members of continuum have non-zero length. Corresponding dual member "looks" either like a point or like an extended object from different "angles".
We confine discussion of this duality to the above informal remarks (we shall not use it in further consideration). But it is worthwhile to note that this duality is similar to wave-particle duality: in quantum mechanics, we have space continuum of classical mechanics (a macroscopic measuring apparatus described by classical rules) and, inside this continuum, some dual objects (microscopic particles) combining alternative properties of a wave (continuum) and a pointlike particle (the countable set).
Consider the maps of the intermediate set I to the sets of real numbers R and natural numbers N .
Let the map I → N decompose I into the countable set of equivalent mutually disjoint infinite subsets: ∪I n = I (n ∈ N ). Let I n be called a unit set. All members of I n have the same countable coordinate n.
Consider the map I → R. By definition, continuum R contains a subset M equivalent to I, i.e., there exists a bijection
This bijection reduces to separation of the intermediate subset M from continuum. Since any separation rule is a proof of existence of the intermediate set and, therefore, contradicts the independence of the continuum hypothesis, we, in principle, do not have a rule for assigning a definite real number to an arbitrary point s of the intermediate set. Hence, any bijection can take the point only to a random real number. If we do not have preferable real numbers, then the mapping is equiprobable, i.e., the point can be found at any real number with equal probability. This already conforms to the quantum free particle. In the general case, we have the probability P (r)dr of finding the point s ∈ I about r. Note that we have used only the independence of CH and the thesis about validity of ZF. Thus the point of the intermediate set has two coordinates: a definite natural number and a random real number:
Only the natural number coordinate gives reliable information about relative positions of the points of the set and, consequently, about size of an interval. But the points of a unit set are indistinguishable. It is clear that the probability P (r) depends on the natural number coordinate of the corresponding point.
For two real numbers a and b the probability P a∪b dr of finding s in the union of the neighborhoods (dr) a ∪ (dr) b
because s corresponds to both (all) points at the same time (the elemental events are not mutually exclusive). In other words, the probability is inevitably non-additive. In order to overcome this obstacle, it is most natural to introduce a function ψ(r) such that P (r) = P[ψ(r)] and ψ a∪b = ψ(a) + ψ(b). The idea is to compute the non-additive probability from some additive object by a simple rule. It is quite clear that this rule should be non-linear. Indeed,
i.e., the dependence P[ψ(r)] is non-linear. We may choose the dependence arbitrarily but the simplest option is always preferable (of course, we must be ready to correct our choice if any restriction will be found.) The simplest nonlinear dependence is square dependence:
We shall not discuss uniqueness of the chosen options. The aim of this paper is to show that quantum mechanics is, at least, one of the simplest and most natural descriptions of the set of intermediate cardinality.
The probability P (r) is not probability density because of its non-additivity. This fact is very important. Actually, the concept of probability should be modified, since the additivity law is one of the axioms of the conventional probability theory (the sample space should consist of the mutually exclusive elemental events). But we shall not alter the concept of probability because it is not altered in quantum mechanics. This means that we shall regard P (r) = |ψ(r)| 2 as probability density, i.e., we accept Born postulate.
The function ψ, necessarily, depends on n: ψ(r) → ψ(n, r). Since n is accurate up to a constant (shift) and the function ψ is defined up to the factor e iconst , we have ψ(n + const, r) = e iconst ψ(n, r).
Hence, the function ψ is of the following form:
Thus the point of the intermediate set corresponds to the function Eq.(7) in continuum. We can specify the point by the function ψ(n, r) before the mapping and by the random real number and the natural number when the mapping has performed. In other words, the function ψ(n, r) may be regarded as the image of s in R between mappings.
Consider probability P (b, a) of finding the point s at b after finding it at a. Let us use a continuous parameter t for correlation between continuous and countable coordinates of the point s (simultaneity) and in order to distinguish between the different mappings (events ordering):
where t a < t < t b and ψ(t) = ψ[n(t), r(t)]. For simplicity, we shall identify the parameter with time without further discussion. Note that we cannot use the direct dependence n = n(r). Since r = r(n) is a random number, the inverse function is meaningless. Assume that for each t ∈ (t a , t b ) there exists the image of the point in continuum R.
Partition interval (t a , t b ) into k equal parts ε:
The conditional probability of of finding the point s at r(t i ) after r(t i−1 ) is given by
i.e.,
where ∆n i = |n(t i ) − n(t i−1 )|. The probability of the sequence of the transitions
is given by
Then probability of the corresponding continuous sequence of the transitions r(t):
where
Since at any time t a < t < t b the point s corresponds to all points of R, it also corresponds to all continuous random sequences of mappings r(t) simultaneously, i.e., probability P [r(t)] of finding the point at any time t a ≤ t ≤ t b on r(t) is non-additive too. Therefore, we introduce an additive functional φ[r(t)]. In the same way as above, we get
Taking into account Eq.(15), we can put
Thus we have
i.e., the probability P (a, b) of finding the point s at b after finding it at a satisfies the conditions of Feynman's approach (section 2-2 of [2] ) for S/h = 2πm. Therefore,
where K(a, b) is the path integral (2-25) of [2] :
Since Feynman does not essentially use in Chap.2 that S/h is just action, the identification of 2πm and S/h may be postponed. In section 2-3 of [2] Feynman explains how the principle of least action follows from the dependence
We can apply the same reasoning to Eq.(19) and, for very large m, get "the principle of least m". This also means that for large m the point s has a definite stationary path and, consequently, a definite continuous coordinate. In other words, the corresponding interval of the intermediate set is sufficiently close to continuum (let the interval be called macroscopic), i.e., cardinality of the intermediate set depends on its size. Recall that we can measure the size of an interval of the set only in the unit sets (some packets of points).
Since large m may be considered as continuous variable, we have
The function n(t) may be regarded as some function of r(t): n(t) = η[r(t)]. It is important that r(t) is not random in the case of large m. Therefore,
where dη drṙ is some function of r,ṙ, and t (note absence of higher time derivatives thanṙ). This is a formulation of the principle of least action, i.e., large m can be identified with action.
Since the value of action depends on units of measurement, we need a parameter h (depending on units only) such that
Finally, we may substitute S/h for 2πm in Eq.(21) and consider Feynman's formulation of quantum mechanics as the natural description of the set of intermediate cardinality.
Since cardinality of an interval of the intermediate set depends on its size, we have three basic kinds of the interval:
Macroscopic interval. This interval is large enough to be regarded as continuos. It has non-zero length.
Microscopic interval. This interval may not be regarded as continuos. It has no length, i.e., its continuos image is exactly a point. Submicroscopic interval. It is an intermediate kind of the interval with unstable random length. Its length is either zero or non-zero random real number depending on mapping. This property is just wave-particle duality: the submicroscopic interval looks either like a point or like a continuous interval. Due to the factor e 2πim in Eq.(18), this instability shows periodic character and may be described by means of the concept of wave. Oscillatory instability makes the difference between the "classical" inexact length and quantum random length (and, in combination with non-additivity, between classical and quantum probabilities). Submicroscopic intervals make the region of quantum mechanics.
Note that we can substitute action for m only for sufficiently high time rate of change of the countable coordinate n because, if ∆n i = |n(t i ) − n(t i−1 )| in Eq.(23) is not sufficiently large to be considered as an (even infinitesimal) interval of continuum, action reduces to zero. In other words, the change in size of the intermediate set, from t a to t b , should not be microscopic (exact zero, from macroscopic point of view). Zero-action may be understood as vanishing of mass of the point. Recall that mass is a factor which appear in Lagrangian of a free point as a peculiar property of the point under consideration, i.e., formally, mass may be regarded as a consequence of the principle of least action [3] and, consequently, of the sufficiently high time rate of change of the countable coordinate (cardinality). Figuratively, mass is something like air drag which is substantial only for sufficiently fast bodies.
Consider the special case of constant time rate of change ν of the countable coordinate n. We have m = ν(t b − t a ). Then "the principle of least m" reduces to "the principle of least t b − t a ". If ν is not sufficiently large (massless point), this is the simplest form of Fermat's least time principle for light. The more general form of Fermat's principle follows from Eq.(23): since
we obviously get
where v(t) = dr/dt. In the case of non-zero action (mass point), the principle of least action and Fermat's principle "work" simultaneously. It is clear that any additional factor can only increase the pure least time. As a result, t b − t a for a massless point bounds below t b − t a for any other point and, therefore, (b − a)/(t b − t a ) for massless point bounds above average speed between the same points a and b for continuous image of any point of the intermediate set. This is a step towards special relativity. Thus, paradoxically, light consist of the slowest points. Note that any spacetime interval τ 2 = (c∆t) 2 − (∆r) 2 along a light beam is exact zero (lightlike or null interval). In this sense, a photon, in Minkowski spacetime, is at absolute rest: it moves no spacetime "distance". Recall that spacetime interval is directly related to relativistic action S rel ∼ dτ and, consequently, to cardinality of the corresponding path. From this fact, in particular, it follows that entangled photons are really very close to each other until the measurement has performed, i.e., we have the proper microscopic interval which has macroscopic image. The submicroscopic stage is skipped in this case (which is usual in optical phenomena), therefore, we do not have random real number. But the direction of the point-like microscopic interval is independent of the direction of the real line and should be generated randomly by the measurement.
Galileo's relativity principle may be considered as a consequence of replacement, in the macroscopic case, of the absolute natural number m by the integral (action): the integrand (Lagrangian) is defined up to the total time derivative. This lack of uniqueness results in the relativity principle (in a sense, microscopic absolute space turns to macroscopic relative space).
In consequence of size-dependence of the intermediate set, there is no need of an external continuous container-set in order to satisfy the basic conclusion that the set of intermediate cardinality must be a subset of continuum. The intermediate set is contained in its own sufficiently large interval. This containerinterval corresponds to the Copenhagen macroscopic measuring apparatus. In other words, the intermediate set is a substantially microscopic set. Separation of the intermediate subset from continuum, in some figurative sense, means "enlargement" of the subset which in turn means increasing of its cardinality and, as a consequence, loss of "microscopicity" of the set, i.e., the separation transforms the subset "beyond recognition".
Thus there are two kinds of continuum: exact mathematical (formal) continuum and approximate real continuum. Formal continuum is highly homogeneous set: its arbitrarily small interval has the same cardinality (number of points) as the entire real line: |dr| = |R|. The infinite number |R| of intermediate points between two converging points of exact continuum never decreases until the points coincide and the set of these points becomes empty at once. This leap is similar to the wave function collapse (conversion of the continuous image of the submicroscopic interval).
As a consequence of its super-homogeneity, formal continuum is static: it does not possess the principle of least action. Note that geometric figures are motionless and massless. Motion, mass, and physical laws should be imported into formal continuum from outside. Motion is a consequence of the structure difference in the intermediate set.
The description of a point in the intermediate set depends on the time rate of change of its path cardinality m.
A sufficiently fast point produces the macroscopic path. It has definite continuous coordinate on the path. Since the principle of least action is an intrinsic property of the set of intermediate cardinality relating to the macroscopic paths in the set, it may be stated that classical mechanics is a description of the point on the macroscopic intermediate interval.
Quantum mechanics describes the point on the submicroscopic interval in terms of the continuous description. This description also has its intrinsic law: the wave equation.
From macroscopic point of view, there are two kinds of points: the true points and the composite points. A composite point (the microscopic interval) consist of an infinite number of points. It is uniquely determined by the natural number of unit sets. Cardinality of the proper microscopic interval may be regarded as some qualitative property of the point. If the interval is destroyed (decay of the corresponding point), this property vanishes and turns to the properties (cardinalities) of the output intervals. (We may formulate the following marginal thesis: qualitative properties are infinite quantities.)
Thus the description of the proper microscopic intervals reduces to the description of transmutation of expanded (non-local) but, at the same time, pointlike objects and their properties.
The string theory clearly shows that particle properties are really properties of some intervals and segments having natural numbers as their inherent characteristics.
We see that the complete description of the set of intermediate cardinality falls into a chain of three theories. Each theory corresponds to a class of approximately equivalent intervals (scale).
Non-equivalent macroscopic, submicroscopic, and microscopic intervals of the set of intermediate cardinality may not be regarded as the same homogeneous axis. As a result the description of a true point in the one-dimensional intermediate set is three-dimensional (or four-dimensional, including time).
Each of the three descriptions has its particular main law, directions, and dimensions. Thus, in addition to teleportation, we have parallel worlds. This worlds are partially autonomous because they are self-contained structures consisting of different unmatched ("inadherent") components. The proper microscopic world consist of the real zero-length points. The submicroscopic world consist of unstable points/intervals (oscillators of quantum field theory). The points of the macro-world are, actually, infinitesimal continuous intervals: any sum (integral) of exact zero values is exact zero and therefore zero-length points can not constitute the real line or its interval.
Macroscopic measuring apparatus forms interface between the macroscopic and submicroscopic worlds. Supersymmetry pretends to a role of interface between the submicroscopic and proper microscopic structures.
At present, all the descriptions are imbedded in the continuous space of classical mechanics. As a result, the dimensions and the directions of the submicroscopic and microscopic descriptions are lost.
The total number of space time dimensions of three 3D descriptions is ten. The same number of dimensions appear in string theories. But the extra dimensions of the intermediate set are essentially microscopic and do not require compactification.
The directions of the submicroscopic and microscopic descriptions are replaced with spin. Reliable separation of the descriptions needs careful examination but it may be preliminarily stated that integer spin is the direction of the microscopic description and half integer spin is the direction of the submicroscopic one. Since the submicroscopic interval is the (unstable) continuous interval, its direction is associated with the direction of the macroscopic continuous interval. Therefore, the submicroscopic direction is not a vector of full value but only spinor.
The direction of the point-like proper microscopic interval is independent of the continuous direction.
Since the microscopic intervals are essentially non-equivalent, it should be expected that the proper microscopic description in turn splits into several "theories" subject to the number of microscopic scales (distinguishable cardinalities). The similar situation is considered as a disadvantage of string theories. This non-equivalent intervals form additional microscopic extra dimensions down to the single unit set.
The answer to the question "why fermions and bosons obey different statistics?" may be very short: "because they belongs to the different descriptions". The Pauli exclusion principle is a condition for keeping inside the submicroscopic description (in other words, this is just a condition of conservation of submi-croscopic cardinality): if two points at a submicroscopic distance come close enough, in the sense of the countable coordinates, they form the proper microscopic interval and go over to the proper microscopic description. In this case, some macroscopic and submicroscopic properties of the points of the interval may be lost.
Each microscopic scale should have analogous condition of conservation of its cardinality, i.e., the law of conservation of some qualitative property. Violation of this law means conversion of initial cardinality into cardinality of another scale.
It is important to stress that the intermediate set is not one more configuration (auxiliary) space. Intermediate cardinality |I| is an infinite fundamental constant: the number of all points in the Universe. This constant is the main experimental result of quantum physics. It is equally valid for micro-physics, macro-physics, and cosmology. Another infinite fundamental constant is cardinality of the unite set |I n |. Thus |N | < |I n | ≪ |I| < |R|.
(28)
Experiments at particle accelerators, on the supposition of continuous space, can be compared to the launching of space vehicles in the framework of Ptolemaic geocentric system. Ptolemaic system was based on the false space model but, long before harmonic analysis, Ptolemy successfully approximated real planetary motion by a combination of circular motions (epicycles). In other words, he used description by symmetries. Modern micro-physics is also based on combining symmetries. Such a description may be considered as some kind of generalization of harmonic analysis. This is a sign of approximate model based on false space concept. No wonder that the complete visual space picture of microscopic phenomena seems impossible and unnecessary: although numerical data can be given by different approximate methods to an arbitrary precision, qualitative description of full value cannot be obtained from a false model anyhow.
The intermediate set allows consistent visualization of all levels (outlined above), although the complete picture becomes complicated by the microscopic and submicroscopic "sub-worlds".
The physical description of nature falls into a collection of different theories steadily resisting unification. The complete description of the intermediate set exhibits the same tendency. This is a consequence of the inherent structural nonuniformity of the set. The theory of everything seems to be an unreal concept analogous to the self-contradictory concept of the set of all sets. It is important to note that this description (or rather the system of descriptions) follows from the only fact: space is neither continuous nor discrete.
